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Abstract

Does the intensity of racial attitudes among voters in the U.S. change from 2004-2016?
Do attitudes of latter-generational racism like negative stereotyping, racial resentment, anti-black
affect, and white identity impact voter’s perceptions of Presidential candidates throughout 2004 2016? Additionally, what is the impact of race on these preferences, specifically white racial
sensitivity? This thesis examines the impact of latter-generational attitudes on Republican
Presidential Candidate affect over a time series of 2004 – 2016. Over time, the Republican Party
is becoming more male, white, and lower income/ educated while the Democrat Party is
becoming more diverse and better educated. Over time, latter generation racial attitudes
positively influence Republican Presidential candidate warmness, especially in 2012 and 2016.
White identity becomes an increasing influence on Republican candidate warmness, along with
racial resentment and anti-black affect across the series, suggesting that the issue of race
continues to be an influencing issue in the 21st century.
Keywords: Racial resentment, latter-generational racism, polarization
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“Continuity and Change of Latter-Generational Racism in the United States from 2004 - 2016”
Chapter 1: Introduction

Does the intensity of racial attitudes among voters in the U.S. change from 2004-2016?
Do attitudes of latter-generational racism like negative stereotyping, racial resentment, anti-black
affect, and white identity impact voter’s perceptions of Presidential candidates throughout 2004 2016? Additionally, what is the impact of race on these preferences, specifically white racial
sensitivity?
The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act effectively ended
the de jure style of racism within the country and put an end to socially accepted ‘overt,’
‘explicit,’ or ‘blatant’ forms of racism. Political scholars Sniderman et al. (1991), Sears et al.
(1997), and Virtanen and Huddy (1998) distinguish between two types of racial attitudes: (1) oldfashioned racism, which are attitudes of racial inferiority, specifically that blacks do not deserve
opportunities of equality, and (2) ‘new,’ ‘symbolic’ racism, the belief that blacks are violating
‘cherished values’ of the American ethos and are making illegitimate demands for change
(McConahay and Hough Jr., 1976). Put simply, old fashion racists believe in principles of
inequality between races, or that whites belong at the top of a hierarchal structure and society
ought to be segregated (1976). New racism, however, is the belief that the legacy of centuries of
institutionalized racism within the US has no lasting impact on today’s black citizens, meaning
individuals who possess ‘new’ racial sensitivity believe in stark equality and ‘color-blindness’
where no racial group ought to receive special incentives over another and ‘blacks should simply
work harder’ (Sears et al., 1997). I investigate the continuity and change of both forms of racial
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attitudes from 2004-2016 to determine their influence on voter’s perceptions of candidates over
time.
According to the Michigan School model of voting, the funnel of causality of voting
behavior demonstrates that partisan identification, then attitudes of party candidates, then group
associations, and finally domestic/ foreign policy attitudes each exert influence on vote choice
(Campbell et al., 1960). Assuming each level within the funnel has some degree of influence on
voting behavior, and racial attitudes are an important group identity in American politics, race
and racial sensitivity may affect perceptions of Presidential candidates. This research examines
whether racial attitudes like stereotyping, resentment, and white identity have changed over the
last 20 years and evaluates their differing effects on presidential candidate affect and warmness.
Additionally, the time series of 2004 to 2016 presents four unique candidates and
historical events surrounding each election year. The presidential election of 2004 introduces the
noticeable beginning of 20 years of increasing party polarization. Racial attitudes, cleavage by
party, appeared uniformly split along traditional party ideals. Additionally, both candidates
within this election were white. 2004 allows the research to determine if racial attitudes are still
present in an election without the explicit salience of race. The election of 2008 was the first time
in American history that a black man successfully won the presidential election. Barack Obama’s
candidacy for president immediately sparked racialized debates and the duration of Obama’s first
term showed increasing polarization within political parties along the lines of race (Tesler,
2016). The Republican candidate at the time explicitly avoided any negative rhetoric or policy
stances on race, as Senator McCain treated Obama as his political equal. I use 2012 because
Obama’s reelection cycle further divided ideology along race lines as blacks grew universally
more supportive of his policies while whites grew a greater disdain for anything associated with
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the President. Additionally, Mitt Romney used racialized rhetoric against President Obama, such
as racialized smear campaigns to excite his base. Finally, the 2016 election, specifically
President Trump, featured an overwhelming amount of racialized campaign rhetoric, targeting
attitudes of intergroup resentment and intragroup white status threat (Mason et al., 2021). Each
election year can individually target aspects of racial identity and presents four different
candidates who uniquely utilize race in different ways.
This research uses data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) to
determine how different measures of contemporary racial attitudes can capture different
dimensions of these attitudes among voters. Two measures of racial attitudes, explicit and
implicit, and four conceptually distinct definitions of racial attitudes best explain different
dimensions of these attitudes: negative stereotyping, racial resentment, anti-black affect, and
white identity. Generally, my results show that explicit racial attitudes, specifically old-fashioned
racial beliefs, have little to no impact on voter presidential preference. Modern forms of racial
sensitivity such as resentment, anti-black affect, and white identity exert a significant impact on
the attitudes of white respondents. Voters holding these beliefs are more likely to view the
Republican candidate warmly across all years, especially attitudes of white identity in 2016
among white voters.
The major findings of this research indicate that race continues to be a deep cleavage in
society and our political parties are becoming more stratified along race. Republicans are
becoming more white, male, and less educated, while the Democrats continue to become more
diverse and more educated. Additionally, this research concludes that racial attitudes are, on
balance, always present and influential in U.S. politics in the 21st century. This means that any
ambitious politician can weaponize and activate these attitudes for their benefit at any time.
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Polarization and the new forms of racial attitudes I measure reached a peak in 2012, an election
where race was exceptionally salient. The mirroring intensities between polarization and racial
attitudes over time suggests a potential correlation between the two, indicating that American
polarization extends beyond party politics and is fueled by racial cleavages.
The issue of race is ingrained into the American political system and the legacy effects of
racial injustice remain apparent throughout American democracy. Even though the United States
may have entered a ‘color-blind’ era of policymaking half a century ago, the lingering
socialization and political power of racialized attitudes remains present. The continued
polarization in party politics has gotten worse and the United States is in a fragile spot,
economically, socially, and politically. A critical focus on the influence of these attitudes and the
different dimensions of them throughout society could benefit the outdated ways policy makers
discuss and view racially disparate impacts of policy.
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Chapter 2: Race, Racism, and Voting in America

This chapter examines the differences between old-fashioned and new definitions of
racism in the U.S, including distinctions made between different versions of ‘new’ racism and
their theoretical underpinnings to better understand how their influence changes over time.
Second, it defines the two pathways all racial attitudes are expressed post-1950s American
society: explicitly and implicitly.

Section 2.1: Old-fashioned Racism versus New, Symbolic Racism
The term ‘old-fashioned racism,’ used by Virtanen and Huddy (1998), refers to blatant
racism and accurately describes the era of Jim Crow Laws, Black Codes, and other de jure forms
of discrimination against people of color. This type of racism is motivated by presumptions of
African racial inferiority and open support for segregation and discrimination (Sniderman et al.,
1991; Sears et al., 1997). These feelings are what political scientists originally used to measure
racist attitudes because these attitudes were explicit and socially acceptable (Virtanen and
Huddy, 1998). Since the ‘50s, these attitudes are increasingly unacceptable in society, as shown
through public opinion data on race equality gathered by the University of Illinois, represented in
Figure 1 below (Krysan and Moberg, 2021). As a result, old-fashioned racial attitudes in
America no longer have considerable effects on politics (Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986). White
Americans now believe in an egalitarian approach to politics, favoring policies and discourse that
support equality between races (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Sears, 1993).
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Figure 1
Support for the Principle of Equality in Schools

NOTE: from Krysan, M., & Moberg, S. "Tracking trends in racial attitudes," April 2021,
Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois System, retrieved from
https://igpa.uillinois.edu/programs/racial_attitudes_2021.
This does not mean, however, that racist attitudes are gone. Kinder and Sears (1981)
agree that sociocultural learning, an ongoing process of child/ adolescent socialization that
instills certain normative attitudes of society into the individual (Kinder and Sears, 1981),
reinforces centuries of widespread negative attitudes towards African Americans (Sears et al.,
1997). Because sociocultural learning in an American context carries these historical overtones,
they contend that the presence of racial prejudice in the United States is still an attitude that
carries significant political power, even if it’s not expressed through old-fashioned means (1997).
Symbolic racism is theoretically grounded in symbolic political theory. As
operationalized by Sears, symbolic political theory argues that humans have strong,
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individualized attitudinal dispositions which can be evoked by specific political symbols (1993).
Racial dispositions within whites, Sears assumes, are the easiest to activate and subsequently
study within America because of the 200-year history of white supremacy in the United States
(Sears et al., 1997). The forms these political symbols take vary between candidate, political
party, and historical setting of the election, however, Sears discovers that the racial attitudes
these symbols activate are not individualistic nor discriminatory. Simply, racialized political
symbols tap into an ever-present backdrop of racialized attitudes rather than individual, specific
attitudes that are unique to each respondent (Sears, 1993).
There is an ever-growing list of ‘new’ racism conceptualizations. Generally, ‘symbolic’
racism is the popular term and assumes that covert racism, and the implicit ways to express those
attitudes, is the form that carries the most political power (Sniderman et al., 1991). Symbolic
racism is the expression of whites’ racial attitudes that blacks are violating ‘cherished values’ of
the American (Protestant-dominated) ethos and are making illegitimate demands for changes in
the racial status quo (McConahay and Hough Jr., 1976). McConahay and Hough argue that
symbolic racism activates racial attitudes that are independent of extraneous variables such as
income, tolerance, occupation, self-concept, etc. (1976) and was developed through 200 years of
anti-black socialization within American society, further supporting Kinder and Sears’
sociocultural learning hypothesis (1981).
Sears et al. offer a three-part definition for symbolic racism. They define it as a societal
paradigm that is a conglomeration of multiple societal attitudes that are remnants of America’s
historical struggle with race (Sears et al., 1997). The first classification requires symbolic racism
to be expressed in terms that are abstract and ideological because it reflects whites’ perception of
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how society ought to be organized. The second classification concerns the content of the term
and is explained through three principles:
1. Racial discrimination is a thing of the past
2. Blacks should just work harder to overcome their disadvantages
3. Blacks are making excessive demands for special treatment and get too much
attention from elites, so their gains are often undeserved (Sears et al., p. 22, 1997)
The final classification of symbolic racism ascribes the origins of these attitudes to be from a
blend of antiblack affect with the perception that blacks violate traditional American values.
Building from this conceptualization, what is the best way to operationalize symbolic
racism? To accurately measure symbolic racism, Kinder and Sanders created a racial resentment
scale that ranks the responses of respondents across a four-battery question administered in
public surveys. The four questions are:
1. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their
way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult
for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
4. It's really a matter of some people just not trying hard enough: if blacks would only try
harder they could be just as well off as whites. (Cramer, 2020)
There are no questions about segregationist attitudes or any old-fashioned racist ideologies,
rather, the use of racialized ‘symbolic’ language in the questions is meant to measure symbolic
racism along a scale of ‘racial resentment.’ By using these conceptualizations of symbolic racism
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and racial resentment, the methods and tools political scientists use to measure racial attitudes
have adapted to more implicit measures, rather than explicit.
An issue within the literature on symbolic racism is the vast amount of language used to
convey similar ideas. To streamline the rhetoric used in this thesis, I use the term “Lattergenerational Racism” (LGR) to encompass all variations of ‘new’ racism in the United States
using traditional conceptualizations of symbolic racism. The term “latter-generational”
distinguishes between ‘old-fashioned’ racism and new racism which transitioned within one
generation (Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986). LGR is not a measure of racial attitudes but it is a
broad term I use to describe the different ways in which symbolic racism, racial resentment, and
other variations of ‘new’ racism present themselves in society. This definition of LGR also
includes the political mechanisms and manifestations of symbolic racism in America.

Section 2.1.1: Explicit Vs. Implicit Racial Attitudes
Explicit
Explicit racial attitudes are negative attitudes that elicit an obvious violation of egalitarian
social policy along the cleavage of race (Peffley et al., 1997). According to Axt, explicit racial
attitudes are usually measured through racial rhetoric responses to survey questions such as
“Would you shake hands with a Negro?” (2018) Explicit measures are often associated with oldfashioned racism since it was socially acceptable to outright support segregation before the
1960s. These questions, when asked, pose a risk of ‘outing’ a racist because any response that
does not support equality or egalitarianism would be perceived as socially unacceptable. Ismail
White in “When Race Matters and When It Doesn’t” (2007) questions the role of implicit and
explicit bias through the lens of white and black “in-groups” to see what activates racial attitudes
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in each group. He does this through targeting policy positions of whites and blacks on non-racial
issues, such as the Iraq War, and racializes certain groups to understand the effect of explicit
cues. White identifies that explicit, negatively black-coded language does not elicit a racial
response within whites and that the data was insignificant. He attributes this to the ‘social
undesirability effect’ and argues that the unwanted social attention of being labeled as racist
stops respondents from truthfully answering surveys (White, 2007).

Implicit
Implicit racism is measured through racially codified rhetoric as opposed to racially
explicit rhetoric. Racially codified rhetoric is a distinct feature of implicit racial attitudes. Using
Kinder and Sears’s conceptualization of racial resentment, the four-question battery they use to
measure racial resentment are statements that both indirectly measure race and directly measure
an alternative American ethos (1981). Their four-question battery implicitly measures attitudes
of race through phrasing questions to explicitly measure individualism, which circumvents the
social undesirability effect and allows respondents to answer truthfully. Symbolic racism
scholars agree that on average, implicit measures are better equipped to measure the political
impact of racial attitudes than traditional explicit measures (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Kinder and
Sanders, 1996; Sears et al., 1997); due to this, special emphasis is placed on implicit measures of
racial attitudes in the research.
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Section 2.2: Socio-psychological Approach to Voting Behavior
This section outlines a major theory of voting that supports the groundwork of my
research: the Michigan School of socio-psychological vote choice; additionally, this section
applies the Michigan model to race and racial attitudes. Originally published by Campbell et al.
in 1960, the Michigan School argues that an individual’s vote choice is largely predetermined by
socio-demographic factors and partisan identification, which act as lenses through which voters
form preferences and attitudes on policy and candidate positions (Campbell et al., 1960).
According to their model, the ‘funnel of causality,’ four distinct sections act in a causal chain of
a funnel, where each previous section influences the next, leading to a final vote choice
(Campbell et al., 1960), as seen in Figure 2. Each of the four sections of the funnel acts in
tandem through time to establish a model of vote choice that is inclusive of both sociological and
psychological factors of the individual.
Figure 2
Funnel of Causality, Michigan School

NOTE: From Campbell, Angus, et al. The American Voter. John Wiley, 1960.
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1. Socio-Demographics
Social demographics refer to groups constructed along social cleavages such as race,
gender, income, education, religion, etc., and can be fixed or changing (Campbell et al., 1960).
Fixed identities of race and gender, for example, are identities assigned at birth and have an
immediate and lasting impact on the way individuals perceive the world (Tajfel and Turner,
2004). Because of this, social demographics are the first ‘lens’ through which individuals view
the choice to vote (Campbell et al., 1960). These demographics are often long-term identities,
meaning they may have significant impact over time due to their unchanging nature. Sociodemographics will often outlive political party affiliation and policy preferences as those
attitudes may change in each election.
Identity politics is how an individual perceives themselves in in-group and out-group
contexts. Identity is central to the ways individuals operate within society and identity politics
specifically focuses on how individuals within different groups perceive, react, and respond to
political events such as elections or policymaking. Tajfel and Turner use two scales to
operationalize their continuum of group identity: “interpersonal-intergroup behavior” (Tajfel and
Turner, 2004, p. 277) and “social mobility-social change” (Tajfel and Turner, 2004, p. 278). At
one end of the “interpersonal-intergroup” continuum is interpersonal behavior, or social
interactions between people that have no regard for group identities and communicate
interpersonally (2004). The more an individual uses group identity to create their own individual
identity and present themselves as an individual ‘group member’ within society represents the
other end of the continuum, “intergroup behavior” (2004). The second continuum is the scale of
‘social mobility’ and ‘social change.’ If an individual believes that the social group/ society they
live in is permeable and flexible, they also believe that through individual efforts, be it luck or
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hard work, they can change their social group identity to something that better reflects their
interest (2004). Social mobility’s counterpart, ‘social change,’ implies that society is rigidly
organized around social groups, and any attempt of an individual to change their individual
group identification is extremely difficult, if not impossible (2004).
By organizing influencing behaviors of socio-demographic identity along a continuum,
Tajfel and Turner create a method of categorization for social group identity that can explain the
complex roles group identities can play on political behavior. I include their conceptualization of
group identities and identity politics because socio-demographic identities such as race and
gender create fixed lenses that influence political opinion over time and help explain why
attitudes regarding race and LGR might influence perceptions of Presidential candidates
(Campbell et al., 1960).

2. Party Identification
Partisan identification is a strong indicator of vote choice and has grown stronger throughout
the years (Campbell et al., 1960). Partisan identification is a form of group identity that occurs
because of socialization, such as the type of education received, demographics, societal
conditions, and more (Kinder and Sears, 1981) and carries a significant impact on the decision to
vote. Voters utilize their party affiliation to act as a cognitive heuristic, or shortcut, to
participation in democratic institutions; voters trust political parties to nominate and vet
candidates who will serve the public, saving time in the process (Campbell et al., 1960).
Although party identification is an important individual influence on vote choice, it’s a relatively
unchanging identity that can last for decades. A citizen’s vote may not always be for their
identified political party and may change from year to year, however, the circumstances
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motivating a temporary flip in partisan vote choice are often not enough to influence a complete
abandonment of a citizen’s registered political party (Campbell et al., 1960).
3. Issues
This section of the funnel has a more direct impact on vote choice than the previous two
and concerns individual’s position on issues, policies, and group identity loyalty (Campbell et
al., 1960). A voter’s stances on domestic and foreign issues have a significant effect on vote
choice, following partisan identification and socio-demographic variables (Campbell et al.,
1960). Voter’s stances on issues also affect perceptions of candidates both within and outside
party lines. If a voter carries strong attitudinal positions about an issue, they are more likely to
select a candidate that supports their beliefs over partisanship (Campbell et al., 1960). Race
relations, for example, is an issue that bleeds into multiple democratic institutions, such as
legislation, executive campaigns/ administrations, and even elections themselves. The act of
‘racial spillover’ is the process of racialized attitudes influencing voter preferences towards raceneutral policy conceptualized by Michael Tesler (2016).
Tesler argues in his book “Post-Racial or Most-Racial?” that symbolic racism became
salient not only through the lingering effects of America’s racially charged past but through the
perception of race relations in America. By analyzing the 2008 election of President Obama,
Tesler discovers that the polarization of the nation’s electorate following the election of
President Obama permeated beyond the presidential election itself and racial attitudes were used
to judge President Obama’s officials and policy decisions (2016).
In further research done by Tesler, President Obama’s association with healthcare
racialized public opinion surrounding health care (2010). As Obamacare became increasingly
discussed in the political sphere, a growing number of white Americans began to resent policy
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language that explicitly mentioned President Obama compared to non-racially charged
“Democrats” (2012). The effects of using President Obama’s name activated racial attitudes
within respondents and created a “spillover effect” of racialization (Tesler, 2012) that resulted in
some Americans believing Obamacare was predisposed to helping blacks over whites, despite an
all-around lack of government-subsidized health care prior to his legislation (Tesler, 2012).

4. Candidates and Election Media
The final influence on vote choice within the Michigan school is the campaign and media
surrounding candidates and issues (Campbell et al., 1960). Influenced by all previous sections of
the funnel, this section captures candidate-specific attitudes and argues that these are the closest
and most direct influences on vote choice because of their impermanent nature (1960). The
circumstances regarding elections change every time, and as such, these attitudes are more
directly associated to vote choice because they are created most recently (1960). This section
also captures candidate exceptionalism, the idea that candidates and their behaviors/ rhetoric
have a unique effect on traditional voting trends and creates more votes for their party. The
presidential elections of 2004 to 2016 all contain unique candidates that each weaponized or
dismantled the problem of race in a way never previously seen in American presidential politics.
Election media is the way candidates support themselves and their platform using television
ads, soundbites, or other media streams. Media and campaigns have a strong effect on national
discourse towards political candidates and policy issues because they control the narrative of the
election. Presidential candidate Trump’s effective takeover of TV news and social media
throughout the campaign season provided a substantial benefit to the Trump campaign and is
credited to be one of the influential factors in the 2016 election results (Sides et al., 2016). The
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Michigan School model of vote choice offers a socio-psychological approach to vote choice and
is the best fit model for understanding the effect of racial attitudes on presidential candidate
perceptions in contemporary U.S. politics.

Section 2.3: Exploring Activation Mechanisms of Racial Attitudes
This section investigates mechanisms that activate racial attitudes in the electorate that
influence presidential candidate perceptions. Understanding that new, symbolic racial attitudes
potentially influence multiple liberal institutions, including vote choice, what mechanisms
activate these attitudes? How are they defined, who uses them the most, and which have the
highest impact in politics? There are four dimensions of LGR that are shown to have the highest
chance of activating voters’ attitudes: negative stereotyping, racial resentment, anti-black affect,
and white identity.
1. Negative Stereotypes
Stereotypes are commonly held beliefs about groups of people. Stereotypes, in this
definition, are not necessarily helpful or harmful nor do they necessarily hold any truth.
Conceptualized by Block in a similar fashion, racial stereotypes are “the widely shared
perceptions that people have about certain social groups and the individuals who are members of
those groups” (Block, 2019).
Because stereotypes are widespread among populations, they can have a far-reaching
effect in politics. For example, negative stereotypes have been activated in the past to shape
public opinion about social welfare programs. Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman examine the
extent to which race biases affect whites’ political judgment towards black welfare recipients
through a statistical analysis of phone surveys (CATI) (Peffley et al., 1997). Their research
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examines how two groups of white Americans react to affirming and dissenting stereotypes, one
that endorses negative stereotypes and one that rejects them. The two stereotypes the researchers
‘activated’ for their experiment were “Black Work Ethic” (the view that blacks, as a group, are
lazy and lack discipline) and “Black Hostility,” or the perceived aggression of blacks as a group
(1997). The stereotypes that Peffley et al. examine use similar language that Sears et al. use to
conceptualize symbolic racism. In this sense, Peffley et al. choose to focus on negative
stereotypes that are the most prevalent in American society, rather than focus on ‘old-fashion’
segregationist attitudes that have little political impact (1997).
Their “Welfare Mother” experiment is designed to test the question: how do whites that
accept/ reject negative stereotypes respond to hypothetical classifications of a mother on
welfare? By asking respondents questions about a hypothetical mother on welfare who is
classified by different races and education levels, researchers discover that those with negative
characterizations of blacks judge black targets more harshly than white targets, while those who
reject negative characterizations of blacks tend to judge blacks more positively than they judge
whites (Peffley et al., 1997, p. 42) White respondents ‘doubled-down’ on their negative
stereotypes towards poor blacks when presented with confirming information in the experiment.
However, the unchanged attitudes toward poor whites that possess negative characteristics
demonstrate that negative stereotyping is influenced predominately by race, rather than
individual actions (1997).
2. Racial Resentment
Racial resentment, conceptualized and operationalized by Kinder and Sanders, is a metric of
evaluation used to identify respondents’ levels using a 4-battery question to capture implicit
attitudes of racial resentment without explicitly violating the creed of egalitarianism. This is a
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very important dimension of LGR because racial resentment has been uniformly studied for over
40 years and will serve as a benchmark for the political influence of “new” racism. Attitudes of
racial resentment tap into dimensions of rugged individualism, perceived violations of American
work ethic, and an assessment on the belief that the only barrier to success is work ethic. This is
done intentionally to offer respondents alternative theoretical justifications for perceived racial
attitudes, preserving the societal norm of egalitarianism (Kinder and Sears, 1981).
A distinction offered by scholars Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo in their work Racialized
Politics that is conceptually tied to LGR is the notion of individualism and prejudice within
American society. The culture of individualism is prevalent throughout all societal proceedings
within America and is often used by individual citizens as a mechanism to reinforce the value of
individual labor over the systems within which the individual operates.
American Individualism and Structural Injustice presents a compelling argument that the
ideology of American individualism blinds the individualist from perceiving institutional
injustice altogether (Turner, 2008). The individualist, believing a person’s problems are the sole
effect of the individual, blocks themselves from viewing the ‘larger picture’ of society that
actively created the environment within which individual decisions are made (2008). The lack of
societal accountability felt by the individualist not only gives them justification for other
people’s problems, such as “they didn’t work hard enough,” it gives the individualist a sense of
non-dependence of others, allowing them to feel separate from other’s problems, and
subsequently not feel responsible to fix it (2008). Using these attitudes as deflectors allow
respondents to avoid explicitly stating racial preferences and will be used in the research as an
accurate and time-tested model of LGR measures.
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3. Anti-black Affect
Anti-black affect is an attitudinal dimension of LGR that bases beliefs on tenants created
by over 200 years of negative attitudes and stereotypes towards blacks (Kinder and Sears, 1981).
Anti-black affect is the belief among whites that blacks, as a group, violate cherished American
ethos of work, and because of that, their demands for racial equality are unfounded, and any
governmental assistance is undeserved (McConahay and Hough, 1976). Anti-black affect is hard
to conceptually pin down, however, survey questions that measure explicit or implicit racial
attitudes can target anti-black affect to measure its effects on politics. For example, an ANES
question targeting anti-black affect is: “Which statement do you agree with the most? Blacks
have ______ influence in politics (too much/ just enough/ too little)” (ANES, 2016). Answers
indicating that blacks have too much influence in politics indicate higher attitudes of anti-black
affect.

4. White Identity Politics
Under Tajfel and Turner’s (2004) operationalization of identity politics, the way race is
viewed as an identity within America is both an in-group and out-group identity that is fixed and
unchanging. Because of this, individualist attitudes that influence racial identity are
conceptualized as “intergroup- ‘social change’” (Tajfel and Turner, 2004). The unchanging
nature of racial identity creates distinct sentiments at an intragroup level that influences how
groups organized along racial identities perceive outside groups.
Within the context of race in America, identity politics that develop along racial attitudes
are present in every racialized group of Americans: minority or white (Knowles and Marshburn,
2010). However, the presence of white identity politics is often overlooked. White identity
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politics, defined by Knowles and Marshburn, is the way in which whites, consciously or
unconsciously, use their race to reinforce the hegemonic structure of whiteness within society
without explicitly violating societal codes of egalitarianism and color-blindness (2010). Under
this definition, white identity politics is best understood to be an intragroup response to
individualistic sentiments of “intergroup-social change” (Tajfel and Turner, 2004).
Jardina’s focus in White Identity Politics is making the claim that the newfound niche of
‘white identity’ in America is born from grievances of whites (Jardina, 2019), specifically the
feeling of power deconsolidation amidst a changing demographic of electorates and ‘white
oppression’ (2019). Whites, following the 2008 and 2016 elections, believe in two rhetorically
opposed stances of America’s race relations: we are now a post-racial society that is inherently
colorblind with no legal barriers to success (Tesler, 2010), and the status of whites is being
threatened by ever-increasing immigration and minority population (Jovita, 2019). Her findings
indicate no relationship between whites’ out-group grievances for others and in-group racial
identification (Jovita, 2019). Essentially, the intragroup racial identification among whites is not
necessarily created out of intergroup conflict, rather, her findings align with Tajfel and Turner’s
findings of social identity politics that ingroup sentiments play a significant role in identity
formation. The sentiments shared in-group by whites are the focus of Jovita’s White Identity
Politics and the shared sense of community and solidarity of in-group grievances is a strong
indicator of how whites carry themselves within the social and political spheres (2019).
The gradual increase of race-based identity politics is indicative of lingering grievances
and racial resentment described by previous scholars; however, its effects are still being
discussed long-term. Sides et al. focus on tangible measurements of racial resentment and
activated racial identity in “Identity Crisis” (2018) by exploring the attitudes activated by the
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Trump campaign in 2016. President Trump was able to activate racial attitudes within whites
because of the shared grievances of feeling ‘left out’ or ‘cheated’ by government social welfare
programs that become synonymous with ‘underserving’ Americans (Sides et al., 2018). Survey
data indicates that economic scarcity, independent of racialized language, had little to no effect
on activating racial attitudes in whites (2018), nor did it correlate with an increased vote share
for President Trump. In addition, whites that believe their economic and cultural superiority is
dwindling overwhelmingly supported Trump in the 2016 election, suggesting that intragroup
attitudes of whites are racially motivated, rather than motivated through purely economic
competition.
The findings of “Identity Crisis” are all in agreement that racial attitudes of intragroup
whites, specifically attitudes about out-group immigration and racial inequality, significantly
influenced the results of the 2016 presidential election. Although President Trump represented a
unique case insofar as his ability to activate racial attitudes more so than candidate/ partisan
attitudes, the findings of Sides et al. indicate that white identity politics have continued to play an
increasing role in presidential elections since the election of President Obama in 2008 and could
potentially influence the results of future elections.
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methods

Does the intensity of racial attitudes among voters in the U.S. change from 2004 - 2016?
Additionally, what is the impact of race on these attitudes, specifically white racial sensitivity?
Do attitudes of latter-generational racism like negative stereotyping, racial resentment, anti-black
affect, and white identity impact voters’ perceptions of Presidential candidates throughout 2004 2016? Using ANES data, I expect to find that the intensity of racial attitudes among U.S. voters
has increased over the past 20 years due to the salience of race following the election of
Presidents Obama and President Trump in 2008/ 2016, respectively. Additionally, I expect that
all dimensions of latter-generational racism influence the perceptions of Presidential candidates
among voters. Specifically, I argue that intensities of LGR will cause a voter to view the
Republican presidential candidate more warmly (or closer) over time because of the tools
utilized by the party to elicit racial cues (Mason et al., 2021). When considering the effect of
being white and racial attitudes, I expect that LGR attitudes are strongest among white voters
across time, especially during the Obama Administration, because of perceived feelings of status
threat along racial lines (Tesler, 2016).
The beginning of the 2000s in America was heavily dominated by foreign policy and
international concerns about terrorism following 9/11, and as such, domestic issues of racial
justice were not necessarily nationwide concerns. The levels of racial attitudes, according to Pew
Research Center, remained consistent throughout the 90s and early 2000s (N.W. et al., 2003),
changing with Barrack Obama announcing his candidacy. Within the past 30 years, the
Democratic party has become associated with minorities and their interests, and because of this, I
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expect to find that those possessing higher intensities of LGR will view the Republican candidate
more positively compared to the Democrat opponent (Brown, 2004).
Recently, the alienation effect experienced by whites during historical moments of racial
progress (Gilens, 2009; Tesler, 2012, 2016) should drive white voters away from the Democratic
party and towards the Republicans. The effects of intragroup white identity should have more of
an impact on perceptions of presidential candidates over time because presidential candidates,
specifically from the Republican party, increasingly activated these attitudes over time. There is
extensive research done by multiple political scientists indicating that the most significant
activation of racial attitudes, positive or negative, occurs within whites more so than any other
racially classified group (White, 2007; Peffley et al., 1997; Sears et al., 1997). Because of this,
this project will focus on the attitudes of whites, in addition to the entire electorate, when
analyzing the relationship between LGR variables and vote choice, expecting these results to be
the most statistically significant.
The following section begins with the methodology of the time series analysis. The next
subsection examines each election year in the time series, including campaign and candidate
particularities and unique circumstances that could have influenced the activation of racial
attitudes. Finally, I discuss variable operationalization and the ANES data set.

Section 3.1: Methodology
I examine change in indicators of latter generation racism over a 20-year period using the
American National Election Studies from 2004 through 2016. First, I report white and non-white
voting trends, controlling for standard demographic factors such as income, education, and
gender, to better understand the general voting patterns during this time. I expect to find that, in
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general, whites over the past 20 years have become more Republican while non-whites have
remained Democratic. I expect this because Republicans, on balance, began the 2000s
emphasizing traditional conservative appeals of small governance and equality of opportunity for
all, as demonstrated by Senator McCain’s platform in 2008 (N.W. et al., 2018). Republican
positions on racial policy shifted slightly around 2012 as presidential candidate Mitt Romney
used negative racial stereotypes against President Obama on the campaign trail with slogans such
as “Obama’s Not Working” (McIlwain and Caliendo, 2014). Further, Republican state lawmakers
began to introduce strict voter identification laws following the decision of Shelby County V.
Holder, the effects of which have been demonstrated to have a disparate negative impact on
minority communities (Stephanopoulos, 2014). Democrats, on the other hand, embodied the
increasingly diverse electorate and utilized grassroots mobilization efforts during the first Obama
campaign to specifically target minority populations (Nelson, 2016). In short, the political parties
have become more demographically separated over the last 20 years.
Next, I examine attitudes of racial in-group and out-group affect among whites and
blacks by measuring group feeling thermometers across four years to examine if there is a
growing divide between intra/intergroup race relations. I expect to find that both attitudes among
blacks are consistently warmer than whites due to the cultural identity of blackness in the U.S.
being a very strong factor that shapes political opinion (Campbell et al., 1960; Kendi, 2016). In
fact, I expect white’s intergroup feelings toward blacks to grow colder throughout the years,
especially in 2016 due to President Trump’s campaign.
I additionally evaluate trends of polarization through a comparison of the average (mean)
of Presidential candidate feeling thermometers to discover if there is any potential overlap in
disparities of intergroup racial warmness and feelings of polarization. Especially in the time of
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Obama and Trump, racial attitudes may have a significant influence on growing polarization
trends between political parties. If this is the case, I expect indicators of high polarization and
low intergroup warmness among whites/ blacks to mirror intensities across the 4 election cycles.
By using the measure of presidential candidate warmness, these trends include candidate
influence and streamline the research towards the regression models.
To measure significance, I employ one-tailed two-sample t-tests on the means of
presidential candidate warmness across respondents’ party affiliation over the time series. I
expect to find that like the attitudes of whites, polarization of both party’s constituents will rise
throughout the years and peak in 2016, caused by increasing social cleavages, campaign and elite
rhetoric, and a failure to compromise within Congress (Sides et al., 2018). The final subsection
of the descriptive results compares the means of four independent LGR index variables across
the time series to examine the continuity and change of these attitudes.
However, simple means comparison analysis are not sufficient to understand the impact
of LGR attitudes on presidential candidate preferences. Accordingly, I estimate three different
multivariate regression models of the four independent LGR measures against Presidential
candidate feeling thermometers of both dominant political parties in chapter 5. Using two
different models, one controlling for white respondents only and the other for the entire sample, I
expect to find that LGR attitudes and measures among white respondents alone are stronger
because most of the LGR variables utilize implicit measures which specifically activate white
racial sensitivity (White, 2007). The final model regresses chosen interaction variables
measuring the impact of both being white and having activated LGR attitudes as a final
examination of both the impact of race and racial attitudes on presidential candidate preferences.
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Section 3.2: Election Cases
A 20-year time series enables the discovery of possible trends or changes in measures of
racism. Second, it is important to understand the unique nuances of each election to better
understand how latter-generational racial attitudes potentially played a role in each.

1. The Election of 2004
The presidential election of 2004 introduces the noticeable beginning of roughly 20 years
of increasing party polarization and constitutional hardball surrounding policy and decisionmaking. The election was between incumbent President George W. Bush and Democratic
candidate John Kerry, a senator from Massachusetts. I selected this election to begin my time
series for three reasons: partisan-led racial attitude ‘stability,’ the whiteness of both candidates,
and the presence of polarization.
The partisan gap along the cleavage of race, according to Pew Research Center, was at
the same levels in 2004 as in the 1980s, demonstrating that although the difference in racial
opinion along party lines was stark, it had not significantly changed in two decades (NW et al.,
2003). According to data in 2003, race was still a side-bar issue in comparison to discussions of
national security following 9/11 and the Iraq War. Because of this, I have selected 2004 because
it will serve as a non-exceptional case for my analysis due to the relatively unchanging nature of
racial attitudes from the 1980s to 2000s (NW et al., 2003).
Additionally, both candidates in this election were white. The lack of attention garnered
to both presidential candidates due to the status quo of the president being white allows
investigation into a time before the influence of President Obama and his race were
commonplace in American discourse. The Democrats opted to be silent on the issues of race
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during this time while Republicans were adamant about their continual adoption of racialized
positions such as the War on Terror, both abroad and at home (Wing, 2012). This essentially
allowed the Democrats to remain egalitarian-oriented in their social policy decisions while
Republicans became the party against racial ‘equity.’ This, in turn, resulted in racial policy
remaining in the background of larger issues.

2. The Election of 2008
The election of 2008 was the first time in American history that a black man successfully
won the democratic primary nomination and became the front runner in a presidential election.
Barack Obama’s candidacy for president immediately sparked debates that were rooted in racial
attitudes as whites didn’t necessarily know if a black man in the White House would look out for
their interests. Obama’s campaign was forced to tirelessly navigate through socialized anti-black
effect and increasing racial spillover, all while still trying to appeal to the attributes of a
“stereotypically positive” black man (Tesler, 2016). Throughout his term, President Obama
would remain diligently neutral on issues of race, even going as far as to denounce claims of
racial prejudice against him on issues such as health care (2016).
Despite his best efforts, the American public over time came to view everything under his
presidency through the lens of race (Tesler, 2012). This process of racialization, or analyzing
political issues and candidates through a racialized lens, continued beyond President Obama’s
campaign well into his presidency as the American public specifically viewed issues such as
health care to be racially motivated (Tesler, 2012). As Obamacare became increasingly discussed
in the political sphere, Tesler documents a growing number of Americans that began to resent
policy language that explicitly mentioned President Obama compared to non-racially charged
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“democrats” (2012). The effects of using President Obama’s name activated racial attitudes
within respondents and created a “spillover effect” of racialization (Tesler, 2012) that resulted in
Americans believing Obamacare was predisposed to helping blacks over whites, despite an allaround lack of government-subsidized health care prior to his legislation (Tesler, 2012).

3. The election of 2012
In 2012, President Obama only received 39% of white vote share (Tesler, 2016), he
experienced a divided Congress along partisan beliefs, and the effects of racialization extended
beyond his reelection (2016). The effect of racial attitudes at this point only seems to be
increasingly pervasive in American political decision making and the election of 2012 is useful
because Obama’s reelection cycle further divided ideology along race lines as blacks grew
universally more supportive of his policies while some whites grew a greater disdain for
anything associated with the President.
Compared to Obama, who focused his immigration stance on offering Dreamers and
undocumented children already in the US a pathway to citizenship, Romney focused on
institutional reform of the naturalization process, such as citizenship through military service and
opening pathways to streamline legal citizenship (Schor, 2021). It could be possible that his
immigration stance was perceived through an emotionally charged lens that stoked feelings of
status threat among white voters due to their preconceived feelings of animus towards
specialized government programs benefiting “others” (Hochschild, 2016).
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4. The election of 2016
The election of 2016 was rife with racially charged elite rhetoric, dog whistles calling for
support of white supremacist ideals, and a general disdain for demographics whites would
generally consider as “others” (Mason et al., 2021). Political researchers Sides et al. and Mason
et al. discovered that President Trump’s support in the 2016 election was predicted by voter-held
attitudes of racial animus against Democrat-oriented minority groups, specifically blacks and
Muslims (Sides et al., 2018; Mason et al., 2021). This was due, in part, to the rhetoric and
campaign strategy employed by the Trump campaign, which actively targeted areas of rural
whites throughout the United States to activate feelings of racial animus and potential status
threat to elicit emotional responses (Hochschild, 2016). The animus Trump was able to use to
secure the election resonated on all sides of the political aisle (Mason et al., 2021) and because of
this, I use the 2016 election as an example of a political action intended to be a racially
motivated backlash. If the hypotheses are true, then the 2016 post-election public opinion on
negative racial attitudes should demonstrate a more significant impact on presidential preference
than in 2004.
Section 3.3: Data and Operationalization of Variables
To test my research question using the ANES datasets from 2004 to 2016, key terms
ought to be defined and operationalized. I use Latter-generational racism (LGR) to encompass all
iterations of “new” racism, i.e. symbolic racism, racial resentment, modern racism, etc. In
addition, the use of the term also encompasses the mechanisms used to activate racial attitudes
such as negative stereotyping, symbolic politics, spillover of racialization, and white identity
politics.
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There is extensive research indicating that the most significant activation of racial
attitudes, positive or negative, occurs among whites more so than in any other racially classified
group (White, 2007; Peffley et al., 1997; Sears et al., 1997). Ismail White concludes that whites
disproportionately react with stronger racialized attitudes when presented with implicit negative
stereotypes about other races (2007). Racialized rhetoric through stereotyping does not
necessarily cause minority groups to lose their racial ambivalence towards policy opinion,
however.
To test the influence of racial attitudes on respondents’ perceptions of presidential
candidates, I use four dimensions of LGR: negative stereotypes, racial resentment, anti-black
affect, and white identity. Each is a concept of LGR attitudes that target four specific
dimensions, respectively: explicit and overt attitudes, rugged individualism/ violation of
American Creeds, and intragroup identities through status threat.
I select negative racial stereotypes as my first measure of LGR attitudes because it uses
explicit measures, meaning it clues in respondents that the question specifically focuses on race.
Using negative stereotypes as an operationalized concept taps into the dimensions of explicit and
overt racial attitudes and allows the thesis to measure the effects of ‘old-fashioned’ racial
attitudes in contemporary American society. I construct index variables from two survey
questions measuring white respondents’ ratings of blacks’ perceived intelligence, work ethic, and
hospitability as a group.1 Responses are coded where higher values indicate higher degrees of
negative stereotyping among respondents.
Racial resentment, conceptualized and operationalized by Kinder and Sanders, is a metric
that identifies respondents’ levels of symbolic racism using a 4-battery question set2 that uses
racially symbolic rhetoric to capture implicit attitudes of racial resentment without explicitly
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violating the creed of egalitarianism. An index variable is constructed where higher values
indicate higher levels of racial resentment. It is vital to include racial resentment because implicit
racial sensitivity has been studied in this way for over 40 years and will serve as a benchmark for
the political influence of “new” racism. Attitudes of racial resentment tap into dimensions of
rugged individualism, perceived violations of American work ethic, and an assessment of the
belief that the only barrier to success is work ethic, all of which serve as ideological deflectors
that allow respondents to truthfully respond to racially codified survey questions without
explicitly violating egalitarian racial norms (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). As with negative
stereotypes, I expect racial resentment attitudes to wield positive, significant influence on
Presidential candidate preferences.
Anti-black affect is best defined as general negative attitudes towards blacks that can take
on multiple forms and dimensions. The final measure I use is anti-black affect expressed through
white identity politics3. Studying the intensities of anti-black affect/ white identity is best
accomplished through a comprehensive approach that touches on three different attitudes:
whites’ perceptions about black influence in politics, whites’ perceptions of white discrimination
(2012-2016), and whites’ attitudes towards government-subsidized specialized assistance to
blacks. Each individual variable taps into two distinct concepts of anti-black affect: general
perceptions of blacks as a group and the plight of black excellence. This final dimension targets
the feeling of status threat that racially sensitive whites experience with the ever-increasing
presence of black influence in politics. Each variable being operationalized will have the
corresponding ANES variable name reported in Table V4. Each variable is separated by year of
dataset and the type of dimension being targeted.
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Chapter 4: Preliminary Results

Generally, the Republican and Democrat parties are diverging across demographics. The
Republican party is becoming more white, less educated, and male, in addition to ceding its
majority to independent parties. Democrats are becoming more diverse, well-educated, and
surprisingly, wealthier over time, while maintaining a similar vote share throughout the series.
Whites are becoming more despondent towards presidential election candidates over time,
supporting the growing independent party share. What’s most surprising is that out-group
warmness of both blacks and whites has decreased over time, while in-group warmness has
remained constant. The salience of race has increased in tandem with trends of polarization as
out-group presidential candidate affect within both political parties has continually declined, with
its lowest in 2016. Finally, all measures of LGR are present in each election among whites in
varying intensities, suggesting that white racialized attitudes can be activated whenever an
ambitious candidate chooses.

Section 4.1: Demographic Trends of Vote Choice
This section describes general trends of vote choice across race, education, gender, and
income between 2004-2016. Tables 1 and 2 report white and non-white vote choice from 20042016. For these tables, non-white includes all demographics, including Blacks, Latinos, Asians,
etc.
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Table 1
White Vote Choice for President, by %

Democrat
Republican
Other

White Vote Choice for Presidential Elections, by %
2004
2008
2012
2016
40.49
44
42.46
40.06
58.03
53.87
54.32
52.6
1.475
2.125
3.22
7.339

Table 2
Non-White Vote Choice for President, by %

Democrat
Republican
Other

Non-White Vote Choice for Presidential Elections, by %
2004
2008
2012
2016
70.79
88.58
82.68
74.63
27.72
10.62
15.45
18.77
1.485
<1%
1.871
6.598

Tables 1 and 2 show that white Democratic vote share has remained consistent over time,
hovering around 41% year over year, yet Republicans have actually lost approximately 6% of the
vote share to Independent identifying voters. For non-whites, the vote share has been heavily
Democratic since 2004 and continued in this fashion to 2016. Non-white Republican vote share
was at its lowest during the election of Obama’s first term and has remained low ever since. The
increase of Independent vote share over time among whites is a reflection of the growing
resentment against the government and the two-party system, showcased by the works of
Hochschild (2016). In general, both Tables 1 and 2 suggest that each election presents
peculiarities that are unique to each campaign and context which cannot be captured by racial
demographics alone.
Tables 3-5 investigate vote share of whites when controlled for education, income, and
gender. Breaking down education into these four categories, whites with less than a HS diploma
voted for Obama 64% of the time in 2008 and then rebound back to higher levels of Republican
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votes in 2016, at 62.75%. Out of the first three tiers of education, less than HS educated whites
were the only group to have a majority Democrat vote in 2008 for Obama. This could be due to
the careful choices used by the Obama campaign in 2008, such as naming Senator Joe Biden as
his Vice President, to appeal to these undereducated whites (Nelson, 2016). Another potential
explanation is that less than HS educated whites did not perceive President Obama to be a status
threat to their livelihood, rather, they viewed him as a mechanism of change, something his
campaign specifically ran on (Nelson, 2016). Regardless, both are explanations that attribute
unique candidate influences to variances in data, confirming the results of Tables 1 and 2.
Similarly, over time, whites who both completed high school and/ or some college
remained majority Republican. However, college-educated whites were the only group to vote
against Trump in 2016, giving the majority to the Democrats. These trends demonstrate the
political phenomenon of “Democratic inversion.” Traditionally, those with high education and
high income tend to vote Republican, as an extensive list of literature documents (McCarty et al.;
NW et al., 2014; NW et al., 2014). However, in recent years, those with a college degree or
higher have flipped partisan identification and became majority Democrats in 2016, A main
explanation for Democratic Inversion is that President Trump was a special candidate that used
populist, quasi anti-democratic rhetoric that caused worry amongst scholars and, in turn, caused a
partisan shift; candidate exceptionalism, therefore, is the best explanation to changing attitudes
among education strata. Table 4 reports partisan identification by income level, measured in
quartiles, for the 4 elections.
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Income
Table 4
White Vote Choice for Presidential Elections, controlled by Income

Excluding the 2008 election, whites in the lowest quartile of income voted for the
Republican candidate over time. However, the difference between party vote share remained low
following the Obama election, as 2004 had the highest amount of Republican, poor white vote
share. This suggests that the campaign rhetoric of the Obama administration potentially reached
all poor Americans, rather than just poor minorities. However, after President Obama was
introduced into office, the partisan flip along the poorest of whites could indicate that the
saliency of race was increased, and in tandem, the issue of status threat became palpable among
poor whites. In the second quartile, similarly, voters sided with the Republican candidate in 2012
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and 2016, the only difference between the first two quartiles was a difference in the partisan
majority in 2004. The highest 50% of income earners voted Republican across the board, except
for the top 25% of income earners in 2016. This change of top income earners voting for Clinton
in 2016 further confirms the ‘Democratic Inversion’ phenomenon. Personally, when both top
education attainment and top income earners flipped partisan identification in 2016, I was
shocked. However, this could suggest that the campaign tactics used by the Trump campaign
were ineffective at convincing top education and income earners to maintain their Republican
stance. I would argue that the exceptionalism of President Trump’s incendiary and negatively
oriented rhetoric disillusioned those at the top and they ‘did not fall’ for his campaign tricks.

Gender
Table 5
White Vote Choice for Presidential Elections, controlled by Gender

Table 5 displays white vote choice by gender across the 4 elections and reports that white
males voted Republican uniformly across the board. In fact, Democrat, white, male vote share
has decreased from 2008, bottoming out in 2016 with a difference of ~7%. White females,
similarly, tend to vote Republican after the 2008 election and maintained similar levels of
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difference between political party vote share in 2012 and 2016. The spike in white female
Democratic votes in 2008 suggests that President Obama being a minority potentially resonated
with all minority demographics to some extent.
In a larger sense, the Republican party is becoming whiter, male, lower-income, and less
educated over time. Conversely, the Democratic party is becoming more diverse, higher income,
and more educated over the past 4 elections. These findings suggest that the Republican party’s
demographics have the potential to be more susceptible to racialized rhetoric and the elites who
employ it, especially covert or implicit racial attitudes (White, 2007). In tandem, the presence of
Democratic Inversion among top education and income respondents in 2016, I argue, is a
response to President Trump’s exceptionalism in 2016, specifically his overt racialized rhetoric
and frequent extremist sympathy. The words and actions candidates say and do have a significant
impact on vote choice and voting preferences. Specifically, it appears that if politicians choose to
employ racialized rhetoric, Republican party identifiers appear more responsive to LGR attitudes
activated and can be manipulated for partisan gain.

Section 4.2: White Affect and Polarization
Table 6 below displays the average feeling thermometer score of whites over the time
series regarding the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates. A feeling thermometer
is ranked along a 100-point scale, where a higher score indicates a higher degree of “warmness”
towards the subject. In the case of this section, the means presented measure whites’ general
“warmness” to both presidential candidates.
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Table 6
Means Comparison of Whites’ Feeling Thermometers towards Presidential Candidates
Year of Study
Whites’ Mean
“Warmness”
Score
Republican
Candidate
Democrat
Candidate

2004

2008

2012

2016

60.68
(33.67)
50.68
(26.71)

54.13
(25.59)
55.51
(28.39)

51.55
(29.85)
48.98
(33.64)

47.13
(35.12)
37.17
(32.99)

NOTE: All responses displayed are controlled for white respondents. Standard deviation in
parenthesis.
Over time, Whites view both parties with less warmth. The highest degree of ‘warmth’
captured by the feeling thermometer was in 2004 when President George W. Bush received a
score of 60. This could be affected by other factors than simply race, such as his incumbency and
response to domestic and foreign affairs that occurred in the early 2000s. However, Democratic
candidates feeling thermometers demonstrate that whites became colder to Democrat candidates,
especially Hillary Clinton in 2016, more so than Republican candidates. This indicates that even
though Whites may not have necessarily voted more Republican over time, their attitudes
towards Democratic presidential candidates have grown colder disproportionate to Republican
candidates. Looking from a macro perspective, the growing coldness towards both parties, but
overall higher warmth for the Republican party, among whites, suggests that a certain platform or
policy position following 2008 caused an increase in white affect. I argue this is the presence of
negative racialized campaign rhetoric, present in both Republican candidates in 2012 and 2016,
increasing year after year (Nelson, 2016; Mason et al., 2021).
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Table 7
Means comparison of whites’ “closeness” to other whites, whites to blacks, and vice versa
Year of Study
2004
2008
2012
2016
Whites’
73.78
72.83
73.64
73.28
“Warmness” to
(19.15)
(19.42)
(18.1)
(18.54)
Whites
Whites’
69.24
67.23
62.57
66.51
“Warmness” to
(18.43)
(19.5)
(20.85)
(20.34)
Blacks
Blacks
72.66
75.76
69.98
65.87
“Warmness” to
(20.04)
(20.14)
(22.07)
(23.92)
Whites
Black
87.05
85.79
84.86
83.96
“Warmness” to
(15.45)
(17.74)
(17.88)
(20.52)
Blacks
NOTE: All responses displayed are controlled for white respondents. Standard deviation in
parenthesis
Table 7 measures intragroup and intergroup attitudes of Blacks and Whites across the 4
elections. I measure these attitudes across these racial demographics to determine if there are
significant changes between either type of attitude to better understand which has a stronger
effect on presidential election preferences. Whites’ feeling of closeness to other whites has
remained steady over time, with less than a 1-point difference over 20 years. This suggests that
neither the introduction of President Obama nor Trump necessarily impacted feelings of
closeness among whites to a very significant level. Similarly, but to a higher degree, black
warmness to other blacks remained very high throughout the time series. The 12-point difference
in warmness between races is not shocking, in fact, these data points match my expectations for
this table, as I expected blacks to have a higher degree of warmness to other blacks. As Knowles
and Marshburn point out, minorities have had their identity ‘welded’ to their race, especially in
an American setting, because of the legacy of discrimination and racism in the US’ past and the
community’s response to it, culturally and socially (2010). This, in turn, reaffirms the disparity

HONORS THESIS

43

between whites’ and blacks’ warmness towards themselves, as blacks have been forced to create
a cultural identity surrounding their race, while whites have not necessarily had to (Tajfel and
Turner, 2004; Kendi, 2016).
On the other hand, when comparing the warmness of whites and blacks towards their
racial ‘counterpart,’ whites view blacks in a colder light than the other way around. This could
imply that whites have always viewed minorities and ‘others’ with a certain degree of coldness.
This is certainly the case pre-1960s, however, it may be the case in the present as well.
Table 8, below, reports one-tailed t-tests of mean attitudes of Democrats and Republicans
towards their respective candidates over time. These tests are measuring which party, if any, is
moving in a negative, polarized direction. When measuring attitudes of the Democratic
candidate, the warmness of Democrat voters hovered within a 16-point range from 65 to 82,
while Republican warmness towards the Democratic Candidates decreased significantly, from 37
in 2008 to 16.09 in 2016. This demonstrates that white Republican voters grew colder towards
the Democratic party’s candidate over time while Democrat warmth remained the same,
potentially indicating increased polarization. Similarly, the t-test results display a growing gap
between partisan attitudes towards presidential candidates, peaking in 2012, the second term of
President Obama. This could be an indicator of race becoming increasingly salient when viewing
the democratic candidate among white Republican voters because of the growing unease and
resentment of poor whites, in addition to the introduction of Mitt Romney’s racially implicit
campaign.
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Table 8
Means Comparison of white, in/out party “Warmness” towards Presidential Candidates
Year of Study
Dem. R towards
Dem. Can
Repub. R
towards Dem.
Can
T-Test of
Significance
Dem. R towards
Repub. Can
Repub. R
towards Repub.
Can
T-Test of
Significance

2004
68.03

2008
70.83

2012
81.61

2016
65.09

32.88

37.48

22.85

16.09

35.15***
(1.50)

33.36***
(1.35)

58.76***
(0.77)

49.0***
(0.98)

32.71

40.48

25.71

19.87

81.76

70.46

75.10

69.20

-49.06***
(1.70)

-29.98***
(1.2)

-49.39***
(0.73)

-49.34***
(1.08)

NOTE: For the purpose of clarity, third party respondents are converted to missing values to
allow significance testing. The first t-test identifies the difference of means of white respondents
towards the Dem. Candidate and is represented by the formula: diff = mean(Democrat R) –
mean(Republican R). The second t-test identifies the difference of means of white respondents
towards the Repub. Candidate and is represented by the same formula.
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
On both sides, oppositional presidential candidate warmness has decreased from 2004. In
general, however, Democrat respondents showed more warmness towards their party compared
to Republican respondents over time. Interestingly, white Republican respondents felt colder
towards the rival presidential candidate during President Obama’s administration than their
democratic counterparts did towards the Republican candidates. This could indicate that
racialized attitudes played a role in evaluating the likeability of President Obama but not in
evaluating the warmness towards Mitt Romney.
But can this polarization be better understood from an in-party perspective? Table 8a.
below measures attitudes of respondents within the same party towards partisan Presidential
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candidates, rather than measuring bipartisan feelings of the same presidential candidate. The
purpose of this table is to further illustrate that attitudes toward the same and opposing
presidential candidate within the same political party voting bloc are growing farther apart. If
this is the case, then the two t-tests of significance will reflect a growing divide between
warmness towards the same party candidate and coldness towards the alternate party’s candidate.
The table reports that the lowest amount of polarized warmness/ coldness between
respondents occurred in the 2008 election. Republicans were warmest to the Democratic
candidate in 2008, and conversely, Democrats were warmest to the Republican presidential
candidate in ’08 as well. This could be due, in part, to the exceptionalism of John McCain in
2008, who, instead of highlighting the differences of race between the candidates to win votes,
championed President Obama’s victory as an exceptional example of the American system of
progress. This result further suggests that the unique character and actions of each candidate is a
strong influence on partisan attitudes.
Following the ’08 election, polarization increases to record levels. The significance tests
between respondents’ attitudes towards the same and different political party have widened to a
concerning amount on both sides. Additionally, the averages of each significance test
demonstrate that Republican respondents have grown more negative towards the other party and
more positive towards their own party than their Democratic counterparts; the average of the ttest results for Democratic respondents is 42 while the average for Republican respondents is 47.
The Republican and Democrat parties are becoming increasingly polarized over time.
The Republican party, which is growing whiter, male, and less educated/ lower income over
time, is also growing further polarized than its counterparty. Among whites and blacks in
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general, intra-group warmness remained consistent throughout the 4 elections, yet white
intergroup warmness towards blacks was lowest during the Obama Administration, with a
rebound of warmness in 2016. This suggests that the salience of President Obama’s race and the
careful activation mechanisms used by the Republican Party in 2012 had some effect on racial
relations among whites in the U.S. Additionally, the rebound of white warmness towards Blacks
following President Trump’s election could suggest that President Trump acted as a sort of
‘pressure release valve’ of built-up racial resentment, and upon being elected, racially conscious
whites felt as though their interests where once again being represented in the White House.
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Table 8a.
Means comparison of white, same-party R with contending Presidential Candidates
Year of Study
Dem. R towards
Dem. Can
Dem. R towards
Repub. Can
T-Test of
Significance
Repub. R
towards Dem.
Can
Repub. R
towards Repub.
Can
T-Test of
Significance

2004
68.03

2008
70.83

2012
81.61

2016
65.09

32.7

40.48

25.71

19.87

35.32***
(1.76)
32.88

30.35***
(1.26)
37.48

55.89***
(0.74)
22.85

45.22***
(1.18)
16.09

81.76

70.46

75.10

69.20

-48.88***
(1.45)

-32.98***
(1.29)

-52.25***
(0.84)

-53.12***
(0.9)

NOTE: For the purpose of clarity, third party respondents are converted to missing values to
allow significance testing. The first t-test identifies the difference of means of white Democratparty respondents towards the two different party candidates and is represented by the formula:
diff = mean(Democrat R -> Democrat Pres. Candidate) – mean(Democrat R -> Republican Pres.
Candidate). The second t-test identifies the difference of means of white Republican-party
respondents towards the two candidates and is represented by the formula mean(Repub R ->
Democrat Pres. Candidate) – mean(Repub R -> Republican Pres. Candidate).
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Section 4.3: Independent Variable Testing
The final section concerns the testing of means of my four measures of LGR: Negative
Stereotypes, Racial Resentment, Anti-Black affect, and White Identity. Table 9 reports the means
of each concept of LGR among white respondents from 2004 – 2016. The table of every variable
name in the original ANES datasets across the time series is listed in the footnotes1.
Table 9
Mean responses of Whites across 4 dimensions of LGR
Measured
Concept

2004

Year of Survey
2008

Negative
Stereotypes1
Racial
Resentment2
Antiblack Affect:3

6.77
(2.05)
11.04
(3.81)

Influence of
Blacks in Politics
White Identity

2012

2016

6.42
(2.21)
11.42
(3.65)

6.67
(2.298)
11.54
(3.796)

7.17
(2.35)
10.28
(4.52)

N/A

2.25
(1.27)

2.88
(1.25)

2.45
(1.27)

N/A

N/A

2.21
(0.89)

2.09
(0.94)

Government
Assistance

4.82
4.99
5.24
4.76
(1.63)
(1.75)
(1.56)
(1.79)
N
608
823
2,332
2,096
NOTE: Stand-alone values are the means of each LGR concept. Standard Deviation is listed in
parentheses.

Attitudes of negative stereotypes were strongest in the 2016 election and weakest in
2008. This indicates that whites generally ascribed to higher levels of negative stereotyping over
time, and it appears that these findings suggest that in 2008, the rhetoric of John McCain did not
activate any negative racial attitudes, and as such, intensities of explicit LGR attitudes would be
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lower than other elections where racialized attitudes were activated. The racial resentment index
variable demonstrates that levels of racial resentment among whites remained constant until
2016, when intensities are at their lowest. During the Obama administration, unlike negative
stereotyping, racial resentment intensities were at their ‘highest,’ although the difference is
marginal.
Anti-black affect remained low throughout all years. This first variable is an explicit
measure of racial attitudes, and because of this, could reflect a value that is not necessarily
reflective of true attitudes, due to whites not wanting to violate social norms of egalitarianism
(Kinder and Sears, 1981). However, whites’ belief that blacks should not receive any form of
specialized assistance peaked during the Obama Administration, and, like racial resentment, was
lowest in 2016. This suggests that whites’ activation of racial attitudes depends on the unique
circumstances of an election; more specifically, these results suggest that negative LGR attitudes
are omnipresent throughout all 4 elections, yet specific candidate actions or special election
circumstances are what activate them to become politically significant.

Section 4.4: Conclusion
In general, the White vote share for the past 20 years has been majority Republican, with
a growing number of whites voting for independent third parties. Over time, the Republican
party has become more white, less educated, lower-income earners, and male. The Democratic
party, conversely, has become more diverse, with a growing number of top income earners and
highly educated. The main interpretation of the data is that racial attitudes are enduring emotions
that are present in every election. They continue to have some presence among voters throughout
the 21st century, even if they do not peak in 2016 as I expected. This could indicate that race has
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become a lens through which whites view issues, influencing white political behavior through
racial spillover. Data from 2008 to 2016 for partisan vote choice could be influenced by the
presence of this racial spillover.
Levels of whites’ Presidential candidate affect have steadily decreased over time for both
parties, in addition to an overall increase of Independent vote share over time; these results
indicate that a growing number of whites are dissatisfied with the two-party system and there
potentially is an increased presence of white originated political animus over time. Attitudes of
respondents toward their party’s Presidential opponent have grown colder across both parties
over time, with Republicans growing generally colder than Democrats. Additionally, when
comparing in-group attitudes of both parties’ respondents towards Presidential candidates,
increasing polarization becomes more apparent, as outgroup Presidential candidate affect has
grown colder at a faster rate than in-group Presidential candidate affect. This indicates that party
polarization has grown over the past 20 years and is most intense within the Republican party.
Four measures of Latter-generational Racism examine three conceptualizations of ‘new’
racism: explicit negative stereotyping, implicit racial resentment, and anti-black affect/
intragroup white identity. Generally, when comparing attitudinal averages across years,
intensities of LGR attitudes do not peak in 2016, however, these results do suggest that LGR
attitudes have remained present within the electorate from 2004-2016 at relatively similar levels.
Because of this, it appears that the role of the candidate and their campaign is instrumental in
activating racial attitudes for them to become politically significant.
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Chapter 5: Multivariate Regression Analysis

This section estimates multi-variate regression models to evaluate the influence of the
four measures of latter-generational discrimination on voters’ perceptions of Presidential
candidates over the past 20 years. I construct two models that regress respondents’ closeness to
the Presidential candidates on five LGR index variables, race, education, income, gender,
partisan identification, marital status, and religiosity.
Before outlining the framework of the regression models, a cause of concern is the
potentiality of multi-collinearity for each of the four independent variables. It may be hard to
definitively decide which independent variable impacts the data uniquely. Due to this, this
section administers a correlation matrix. If the correlation matrices produce a value of 0.75 or
above, then multicollinearity is likely present.
In 2004, 2008, and 2012, none of the four independent variables being tested resulted in a
correlation variable above a 0.55, 0.49, and 0.59, respectively. The highest values of these three
years were between racial resentment and anti-black affect. In 2016, the correlation variable
between ABA and RR is 0.66 for a regular correlation matrix. All other values fell below the
threshold. This suggests that any regression models using these variables will not be affected by
multi-collinearity and every variable will be ran together in the models. All multi-collinearity
matrices are included in the footnotes5.
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Section 5.2: Republican Presidential Candidate Affect Regression Model
Each regression model includes all 4 measures of LGR and traditional control variables
to understand their impact on Presidential candidate affect from 2004-2012. The control
variables that are used for the following models are standard demographic indicators6. Each are
included to determine the impact of the four independent measures of LGR when traditional
indicators of vote choice are held constant. Table 10 reports the first model, which regresses
respondent closeness to the Republican Presidential candidate on LGR index variables, race, and
demographic controls. Race is encoded as a dummy variable where Black is the excluded
condition. This dummy variable captures the effect of being white on Republican candidate
preferences.
There are four major conclusions that emerge from the results. First, across most of the
20 years, implicit LGR attitudes are present and significant among voters. As attitudes of
resentment rise, general affect for the Republican Presidential candidate increases, with the
highest intensity being in 2016. Anti-black affect also positively influences Republican candidate
affect across the board except for the variable measuring self-held perceptions of specialized aid
to blacks in 2016. Surprisingly, in both 2004 and 2008, resentment and anti-black affect had
more of an influence in Republican presidential candidate likeness than income, education level,
and gender. In tandem, both measures of LGR suggest that racialized attitudes do have an impact
on the warmness respondents feel towards the Republican candidate and LGR attitudes are
influential in political preferences.
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Table 10
Multi-variate Regression: LGR attitudes on Republican Candidate Warmness across Full Sample
Republican Presidential Candidate Feeling Thermometer
2004
-0.55
(0.32)

2008
0.35
(0.28)

2012
-0.52*
(0.2)

2016
0.01
(0.2)

Racial Resentment
(Index variable)

1.00***
(0.29)

0.41*
(0.21)

1.44***
(0.15)

1.93***
(0.15)

Anti-Black Affect
(black influence)

N/A

1.71**
(0.56)

3.54***
(0.41)

2.35***
(0.42)

White Identity
(white discrimination)

N/A

N/A

0.42
(0.52)

1.77***
(0.5)

Anti-Black Affect
(Self aid to blck scale)

3.20***
(0.65)

1.1**
(0.40)

2.31***
(0.34)

0.58
(0.32)

Race

-5.76*
(2.91)

4.44*
(1.71)

7.00***
(1.32)

2.96**
(1.1)

Income

-0.28
(0.78)

-0.15
(0.79)

-0.44
(0.44)

-1.58***
(0.37)

Education Level

-1.63
(0.99)

0.60
(0.73)

1.42**
(0.52)

-2.88***
(0.55)

Gender

-1.13
(1.92)

-1.11
(1.33)

1.64
(0.90)

-2.31**
(0.89)

Partisan ID

42.83***
(2.12)

24.65***
(1.56)

10.37***
(0.67)

34.01***
(1.15)

Religiosity

-2.34***
(0.7)

-1.94***
(0.5)

-2.90***
(0.31)

-1.33***
(0.3)

Marital Status

-0.69
(0.55)

-0.33
(0.39)

-0.99***
(0.23)

-0.42
(0.23)

cons

22.17
(54.77)
665

8.39
(24.30)
1,162

-2.7
(3.21)
3,015

147.35***
(26.30)
2,556

0.57

0.37

0.40

0.61

Negative Stereotypes
(Index variable)

N
Adjusted R-Squared

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<=.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Includes all R’s as race is
used as a control.

HONORS THESIS

54

Second, the explicit measurement of negative stereotypes does little to influence
Republican affect. It appears that the only significant relationship demonstrated was negatively
oriented in 2012, meaning the belief in negative stereotypes decreased Republican candidate
affect in 2012. This is an interesting finding which challenges my initial expectations. A
plausible explanation to this is the explicit nature of the questions being asked. Because whites
will go to great lengths to avoid violating the egalitarian norms in the US, perhaps respondents
felt as though their response to explicit measures of racial attitudes would be judged (Kinder and
Sears, 1981). The lack of influence negative stereotypes has on Republican candidate affect was
most surprising in 2016 since President Trump effectively utilized these stereotypes to activate
some whites’ animus (Mason et al., 2021) and win the election. Nonetheless, the lack of
influence negative stereotyping holds over respondent affect for Republican presidential
candidates signals that explicit measures of racial attitudes may no longer be effective measures
of racist attitudes.
Third, the positive relationship between white identity and Republican presidential
candidate affect demonstrates that Donald Trump effectively targeted these attitudes and
activated them, increasing overall warmness. The presence of President Trump’s rhetoric, I’d
argue, reignited feelings of status threat to a degree significant enough to influence whites’
perception of the Republican candidate and reinforces the premise that the identity of whiteness
is becoming increasingly salient among white voters, and in turn, is being utilized by the
Republican party to win the presidency (Tesler, 2012; Hochschild, 2016; Sides et al., 2018;
Mason et al., 2021).
It appears, in general that the intensity of these attitudes depends on the individual
politician and their choice to activate them through rhetoric. The unique activation of resentment

HONORS THESIS

55

and white identity by President Trump was very explicit compared to previous elections when
the Republican party’s front runner dissuaded any activation mechanisms of negative racial
sensitivity. When race was not a salient issue, like in 2004, racial attitudes may have influenced
Republican candidate perceptions in the model, however, the large, significant coefficient of
partisan identification, along with a lack of significant controls, may indicate that other issues
outside of the model may have had a greater effect. This suggests that race is a deep cleavage in
the United States, regardless of more pressing domestic and foreign issues.
The variable measuring race, specifically the role of whiteness, produces the most
interesting results over time. From 2008 to 2016, being white increased a respondents’ warmness
to Republican candidates, with the highest impact occurring during President Obama’s term
(coefficients of 4.44 and 7). This suggests that whites are more likely to have warmer attitudes
towards Republican presidential candidates following the introduction of President Obama in
2008. In 2004, however, the relationship was negative and being white decreased a respondent’s
warmness towards a Republican candidate. This could be explained by international affairs such
as Iraq affecting public perceptions. White respondents may have become disaffected with the
Bush Administration’s actions throughout the Iraq War and have little to do with race itself.
The findings in Table 10 imply that more intense LGR attitudes of respondents,
regardless of their own race, have a demonstrated positive relationship with Republican
presidential candidate affect over time. These models, however, do not capture whether there is
an interactive relationship between race and negative attitudes. Due to this, I construct
interaction terms between the race dummy variable and each LGR variable. The resulting 5
interaction variables are included, labeled numerically in ascending order, with the complete
model presented in Appendix A. However, including all interaction variables produces unclear
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results. For example, racial resentment stayed positively significant in 2012 and 2016, however,
its interaction variable displayed significance only in 2016, and the individual variable lost its
significance in 2004/ 2008. Likewise, most individual LGR and control variables lost their
significance within certain years, contradicting the previous models.
Because of this, I construct a model of best fit by selectively including certain interaction
terms that demonstrate significance from Appendix A. Due to a lack of ANES questions
measuring certain LGR attitudes prior to 2012, I condense two separate models of best fit into
Table 11, split between 2004-2008 and 2012-2016. For the first two years, I include interaction
variables 1, negative stereotyping, and 3, perceptions of black influence in politics (ABA #3),
while the latter two years use interaction variables 2, racial resentment, and 4, white identity. I
expect to find the interaction variables will be statistically significant and produce positive
coefficients.
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Table 11
Multi-Variate Regression: Model of Best Fit

Negative Stereotypes
(Index variable)

Republican Presidential Candidate Feeling Thermometer
2004
2008
2012
2016
-1.05
1.06*
-0.53**
0.00
(0.7)
(0.46)
(0.20)
(0.19)

Racial Resentment
(Index variable)

0.99***
(0.29)

0.43*
(0.21)

0.89***
(0.27)

1.55***
(0.22)

Anti-Black Affect
(black influence)

N/A

4.64***
(1.22)

3.43***
(0.41)

2.36***
(0.41)

White Identity
(white
discrimination)

N/A

N/A

2.12*
(0.97)

-0.76
(0.91)

3.16***
(0.65)

1.14**
(0.39)

2.28***
(0.34)

0.52
(0.32)

Interaction 1:
(race x NS)

0.63
(0.8)

-1.04
(0.57)

N/A

N/A

Interaction 2:
(race x RR)

N/A

N/A

0.74*
(0.30)

0.5*
(0.23)

Interaction 3:
(race x ABA1)

N/A

-3.64**
(1.36)

N/A

N/A

Interaction 4:
(race x Wht Iden)

N/A

N/A

-2.36*
(1.14)

3.47***
(1.08)

Race

-10.9
(7.13)

16.05***
(4.31)

5.80
(3.19)

-7.70**
(2.69)

Income

-0.27
(0.78)

0.05
(0.79)

-0.48
(0.44)

-1.56***
(0.36)

Education Level

-1.64
(0.99)

0.61
(0.73)

1.46**
(0.52)

-2.99***
(0.55)

Gender

-1.07
(1.92)

-1.36
(1.33)

1.76
(0.90)

-2.45**
(0.90)

Anti-Black Affect
(Self-place aid to
blacks scale)
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Partisan ID

42.77***
(2.12)

25.17***
(1.56)

10.26***
(0.69)

33.80***
(1.14)

Religiosity

-2.33***
(0.7)

-1.99***
(0.5)

-2.89***
(0.31)

-1.26***
(0.30)

Marital Status

-0.7
(0.55)

-0.33
(0.39)

-0.98***
(0.23)

-0.45
(0.23)

cons
N

25.92
(55)
665

-6.52
(24.69)
1,162

-1.76
(3.88)
3.015

156.42***
(26.36)
2,556

Adjusted R-Squared

0.57

0.37

0.4

0.61

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<=.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Includes all R’s as race is
used as a control.

There are consistent results across all 3 models. Variables measuring racial resentment
and anti-black affect (ABA) through perceptions of blacks in politics regardless of race,
positively influence a respondent’s Republican Presidential candidate affect every election year.
Interestingly, negative stereotyping did influence Republican Presidential candidate affect in
2008 and 2012, but negatively in the latter election. Additionally, I expected race to be somewhat
insignificant in 2004 because of an overall lack of racial issues being salient during the time of
the campaigns, however, race being an insignificant influence on Republican candidate
warmness in 2012 is surprising. This result indicates that presidential candidate preference
towards Mitt Romney was not necessarily influenced by being white, however, it was positively
influenced by harboring negative racial attitudes.
In 2012, the original measure of white identity reports a positive relationship, while the
interaction is negative. It appears that stronger attitudes of white identity, regardless of race, did
influence respondent warmness towards the Republican candidate in 2012, however, higher
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intensities of white identity among whites created distance between racial sensitive whites and
the Republican candidate in 2012. One potential explanation could be the increase in feelings of
status threat among whites generated through Mitt Romney’s immigration stance in 2012.
White identity reports the largest significant coefficient out of all interaction terms in
2016, suggesting that President Trump completely reversed the relationship between white
identity attitudes and Republican candidate affect in 4 years. This is a troubling finding because
it implies that if candidates can effectively utilize racially coded language to evoke whites
racialized attitudes, it may not be a phenomenon exclusive to President Trump.
The final measure of anti-black affect, the extent to which respondents’ feels the
government ought to offer specialized assistance to blacks, was significant as an individual
variable from 2004 to 2012, yielding a positive coefficient. Its interaction term was omitted due
to insignificance. This suggests that before and during President Obama’s administration, antiblack affect correlates to a higher degree of Republican candidate warmth. The presence of
Obama in the White House, as an incumbent, in addition to the racialized campaign rhetoric of
Mitt Romney, reignited significant anti-black affect which may be further explained by the
phenomenon of racial spillover (Tesler, 2012).
However, turning attention to race shows that being white had a negative influence on
respondent’s Republican candidate affect, regardless of racial attitudes in 2016. A negative
relationship between race and candidate warmness, yet positive relationship with whiteinteracted LGR variables shows conflicting results. These results reinforce the idea that President
Trump selectively targeted racially sensitive whites during his campaign in 2016 and was able to
mobilize them for political gain. He was not able to use racial rhetoric to mobilize all white
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voters, in fact, the results suggest that whites who do not possess negative racial attitudes
actively distanced themselves from President Trump and the Republican party in 2016.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion

This research examines continuity and change of latter-generational racial attitudes from
2004 – 2016, the effect of four LGR dimensions on voters’ presidential candidate perceptions,
and the interaction of whiteness on these attitudes. Using multi-variate regression models, I
examine how race and intensities of LGR attitudes including negative stereotyping, racial
resentment, anti-black affect, and white identity impact voter’s Presidential candidate
perceptions in the 21st century. My first and second hypotheses are partially rejected because all
dimensions of LGR do not become more intense over time nor do they all influence Republican
candidate affect. Negative stereotyping, anti-black affect measure #1 (influence of blacks in
politics), and anti-black affect #3 (self-aid to black’s scale) did not become more intense by
2016. In fact, both anti-black affect variables suggest that attitudes of anti-black affect become
less intense over time. However, my results do demonstrate that certain LGR attitudes,
specifically racial resentment, and white identity, build in intensity and significance throughout
the series, culminating in 2016. These attitudes are strongest in 2016 because President Trump
directly targeted and activated attitudes of political animus and white status threat during his
campaign. In general, my findings demonstrate that most LGR attitudes, excluding negative
stereotyping, have a positive relationship on respondent’s Republican Presidential candidate
affect.
With the Republican party becoming more white, male, and less educated, whiteness
increasingly influenced Republican candidate affect during the elections of Obama and Trump,
suggesting that the influence and strength of race depends partially upon candidate’s choices to
target the cleavage. My final hypothesis, that LGR attitudes are strongest among white voters
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across time, especially during the Obama Administration, is rejected. Interaction terms report
that white LGR attitudes become increasingly significant over time, peaking in 2016 with the
white identity interaction variable; the original LGR index variables, however, demonstrate more
widespread significance across both years and conceptual dimensions.
What are the implications of these results for the US and what can be done? In general,
the results suggest that race continues to be a deep cleavage within society that has direct
influence on political preferences. Polarization trends, racial out-group coldness, and LGR
attitude intensities peak in similar election years. In tandem, the increasing racial homogeneity of
the Republican party and growing racial diversity of the Democrat party over time indicate that
race is and will continue to be a main contributor to the growing polarization trends of American
government. Additionally, racial sensitivity (LGR attitudes) is based upon emotions, specifically
resentment and affect. These attitudes are always present among the electorate, waiting to be
activated. This is a worrisome finding because it indicates that any ambitious politician, such as
President Trump, can use racialized campaign rhetoric and activate underlying racial sensitivity
among the electorate to increase political appeal. If politicians choose to use racial attitudes as a
political tool, it comes at the cost of further dividing the electorate.
The most important takeaway from this research is that the continual and increasing
frequency Republican candidates activate LGR attitudes is a potential threat to democracy and its
norms in the United States. When Republicans continually use activated racial attitudes to gain
political power, they are using anti-pluralist practices that selectively target and potentially
exclude minorities from having an equal political voice. Discounting political participation from
minorities as unequal or unjust does not further democratic pluralism, where competing interests
all receive equal recognition and representation within government. Additionally, invoking racial
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rhetoric lowers racial tolerance among party members and alienates entire demographics of
voters, specifically minorities. Both norms are fundamental to a healthy democracy. Finally, deep
identity cleavages like race are most appealing to populist and anti-democratic leaders because
they fuel intense polarization that can freeze democracies. If ambitious anti-democratic
politicians are able to effectively activate racial cleavages for political gain, like what has been
done in the past, the consequences could be troublesome for American democracy.
One last implication of these findings is that new waves of political decisions occurring
on behalf of the Republican party, seen through legislation as the “Anti-Critical Race Theory
Bill” and “Don’t Say Gay Bill” in Florida under Governor DeSantis, could be an attempt to
further homogenize the Republican party along racial lines and appeal to the growing racially
sensitive radical base. Often referred to as the new ‘Culture War,’ the growing attacks against
groups of people Republicans deem as “others” through legislation, court cases, or media
discourse could be driven by these trends and fueled by this cleavage. If this assumption is
correct, the erosion of democratic norms by Republican politicians is intentional, a worrisome
conclusion for the current state of American democracy.
But there is hope. Despite negative racial attitudes being present and influential in every
election, they were only politically salient when activated. This means that a return to democratic
tolerance is possible if we discover a way to properly honor and bury the weapon of race. It
seems turning a color-blind eye has not worked, nor has digging back up racial divides and
reigniting a grim past. I believe that the best way forward is a renewed commitment from the
American people to rectify the injustices of our past by refusing to open our democracy to any
politicians who do not support principles of equality, inclusivity, and pluralism. Although racism
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may never disappear from the U.S., refusing to give it any political power is a vital first step in
fixing a wound that has long divided our nation.
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Appendix A

Multi-variate Regression: Republican Presidential Candidate Warmness on LGR, Controls,
Interaction Terms

Negative Stereotypes
(Index variable)

Republican Presidential Candidate Feeling Thermometer
2004
2008
2012
2016
-0.96
1.07*
-0.07
0.27
(0.71)
(0.46)
(0.38)
(0.35)

Racial Resentment
(Index variable)

0.86
(0.64)

0.45
(0.35)

1.05***
(0.29)

1.55***
(0.26)

Anti-Black Affect
(black influence)

N/A

4.64***
(1.23)

1.57
(0.92)

2.01*
(0.82)

White Identity
(white discrimination)

N/A

N/A

2.40*
(0.98)

-0.67
(0.92)

4.98***
(1.17)

0.99
(0.61)

1.61**
(0.56)

0.43
(0.53)

Interaction 1:
(race x NS)

0.60
(0.79)

-1.06
(0.58)

-0.69
(0.45)

-0.4
(0.43)

Interaction 2:
(race x RR)

0.26
(0.71)

-0.04
(0.43)

0.48
(0.34)

0.49
(0.31)

Interaction 3:
(race x ABA1)

N/A

-3.64**
(1.38)

2.35*
(1.03)

0.46
(0.94)

Interaction 4:
(race x ABA2)

N/A

N/A

-2.72*
(1.16)

3.37**
(1.09)

Interaction 5:
(race x ABA3)

-2.61
(1.39)

0.25
(0.8)

0.98
(0.70)

0.14
(0.66)

Race

-3.7
(9.30)

15.58**
(5.33)

4.14
(4.17)

-6.19
(3.63)

Income

-0.28
(0.78)

0.06
(0.79)

-0.49
(0.44)

-1.57***
(0.37)

Anti-Black Affect
(Self-place aid to
blacks scale)
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Education Level

-1.65
(0.99)

0.61
(0.73)

1.43**
(0.52)

-2.98***
(0.55)

Gender

-1.16
(1.92)

-1.36
(1.33)

1.69
(0.90)

-2.45**
(0.89)

Partisan ID

43.16***
(2.14)

25.1***
(1.58)

10.17***
(0.70)

33.8***
(1.15)

Religiosity

-2.33***
(0.7)

-2***
(0.5)

-2.84***
(0.31)

-1.26***
(0.29)

Marital Status

-0.71
(0.55)

-0.33
(0.39)

-0.97***
(0.23)

-0.45*
(0.23)

cons

21.19
(55.31)
665

-6.27
(24.83)
1,162

0.01
(4.38)
3,015

156.32***
(26.37)
2,556

0.57

0.37

0.40

0.61

N
Adjusted R-Squared

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<=.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Includes all respondents
as race is used as a control.
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Endnotes

1

The language of each individual question that comprises the index variable measuring

negative stereotypes are listed below.
1. Where would you rate blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates unintelligent, 7
means intelligent, and 4 indicates most blacks are not closer to one end or the other.)
2. Where would you rate blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates hard working, 7
means lazy, and 4 indicates most blacks are not closer to one end or the other.)
3. Where would you rate blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates peaceful, 7 means
violent, and 4 indicates most blacks are not closer to one end or the other.)
Respondent data for question 1 is only available in pre- 2012 data, all datasets contain question
2, and question 3 is considered for 2016. Four index variables, one per election year studied, are
created using a uniform variable of perceptions about black work ethic, while the other variable
in each index is constructed from the question available during that year. All original variables
are ranked along a 7-point scale where a value of 1 indicates positive group racial attitudes and 7
indicates highly negative group racial attitudes. The constructed index variable is reduced for
uniformity to a scale of 1 to 13, where 13 indicates high negative group racial attitudes.

2

The index variable of racial resentment is derived from Kinder and Sanders’ racial

resentment scale which is a set of four questions where higher values indicate greater attitudes of
racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders, 1981). The questions are:
1. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their
way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

HONORS THESIS

74

2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult
for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
4. It's really a matter of some people just not trying hard enough: if blacks would only try
harder they could be just as well off as whites.
Because higher values of the index variable indicate greater resentment, the polarity of
questions 1 and 4 of the battery are reversed. All individual variables were recoded to reject
missing values and the indexed variable was recoded to reflect a range of 1 to 17.

3

The questions for each individual variable for white identity is below:
Q1, Black influence: Would you say that blacks have too much influence in American
politics, just about the right amount of influence in American politics, or too little
influence in American politics?
Q2, White Discrimination: How much discrimination is there in the United States today
against each of the following groups? Whites
Q3, Government Assistance: Where would you place yourself on this scale? From 1-7,
either the government should help blacks, or blacks should help themselves?

The first variable measuring white perceptions of black influence is along a 5-point scale where
the lower value indicates there’s not enough influence and a higher value indicates that there is
too much influence in American politics. The data’s responses were flipped in polarity to reflect
a higher value representing higher levels of anti-black affect. NOTE: Data for Question #1 is not
available in 2004.
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The second question is ranked along a 5-point scale where a higher value represents
greater levels of white identity. NOTE: Data for question #2 is not available in 2004 and 2008.
The final question is ranked along a 7-point scale and measures where the respondent
would rate how they feel personally about specialized governmental assistance to blacks. Higher
values indicate a higher level of white identity.

4

Table V

Variable names, by concept by year
2004
Measured
Concept
Negative
Stereotypes

Racial
Resentment

Antiblack
effect

Year of Survey
2008

2012

1. V045227
2. V045223
3. N/A

1. V085175b
2. V085174b
3. N/A

1. stype_intblack
2.stype_hwkblack
3. N/A

V045193
V045194
V045195
V045196

V085143-6

1. N/A
2. N/A
3. V043158

1. V085114
2. N/A
3. V083137

Resent_ >
Workway
Slavery
Deserve
Try
1. racecasi_infblacks
2. discrim_whites
3. aidblack_self

V085063c

ft_rpc

Dependent
Variable
Repub
V045043
Candidate
Feeling
Thermometer

2016
1. N/A
2.
V162346
3.
V162350
V1622124

1.
V162323
2.
V162360
3.
V161198

V161087
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All multicollinearity matrices are listed below, by year.

2004-

NS
RR
ABA1
ABA2
ABA3

Negative
Stereotypes

Racial
Resentment

1.00
0.26
X
x
0.25

1.00
x
x
0.55

Negative
Stereotypes

Racial
Resentment

1.00
0.26
0.10
x
0.25

1.00
0.37
x
0.55

Negative
Stereotypes

Racial
Resentment

1.00
0.26
0.25
0.10
0.25

1.00
0.46
0.25
0.55

ABA1 (black
influence in
politics)
X
X
x

ABA2 (white ABA3 (Selfidentity)
Aid to
Blacks)
X
x
1.00

ABA1 (black
influence in
politics)
1.00
X
0.26

ABA2 (white ABA3 (Selfidentity)
Aid to
Blacks)
X
x
1.00

ABA1 (black
influence in
politics)
1.00
0.26
0.36

ABA2 (white ABA3 (Selfidentity)
Aid to
Blacks)
1.00
0.17
1.00

2008-

NS
RR
ABA1
ABA2
ABA3
2012-

NS
RR
ABA1
ABA2
ABA3
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2016-

NS
RR
ABA1
ABA2
ABA3

6

Negative
Stereotypes

Racial
Resentment

1.00
0.38
0.2
0.14
0.31

1.00
0.52
0.31
0.66

ABA1 (black
influence in
politics)
1.00
0.28
0.42

ABA2 (white ABA3 (Selfidentity)
Aid to
Blacks)
1.00
0.25
1.00

The formation and operationalization of the control variables are discussed here. To

begin, education, income, and gender are operationalized in the same format as the descriptive
statistics section. Education is split amongst four categories, ranging from no HS diploma to
Bachelor’s or Higher. Income is split along four major quartiles, and gender is contained to a
dummy variable of male or female. NOTE: Third gender options are omitted since they were
only present in the 2016 ANES survey and contained an N response of ’13.’ Marital status is
correlated along single, married, divorced, or widowed across the time series. Finally, religiosity
is measured in 2004-2008 through the number of times a respondent prays throughout the week,
from never to multiple times a day. In 2012, a question administered by the ANES asked
respondents about the importance of religion to their identity. The response options are coded
from extremely important having a value of ‘1’ and not at all important having a value of ‘5.’ The
polarity of this question is in the same direction as the others used to measure religiosity in 20042008. In 2016, the measure of religiosity is done through religious service attendance, ranging
from never to every week.

